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Abstract
Inspired by the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem [1], we introduce a new query complexity
model, which we call bomb query complexity B(f). We investigate its relationship with the usual
quantum query complexity Q(f), and show that B(f) = Θ(Q(f)2).
This result gives a new method to upper bound the quantum query complexity: we give a method
of finding bomb query algorithms from classical algorithms, which then provide nonconstructive up-
per bounds on Q(f) = Θ(
√
B(f)). We subsequently were able to give explicit quantum algorithms
matching our upper bound method. We apply this method on the single-source shortest paths problem
on unweighted graphs, obtaining an algorithm with O(n1.5) quantum query complexity, improving the
best known algorithm of O(n1.5
√
log n) [2]. Applying this method to the maximum bipartite matching
problem gives an O(n1.75) algorithm, improving the best known trivial O(n2) upper bound.
1 Introduction
Quantum query complexity is an important method of understanding the power of quantum computers. In
this model we are given a black-box containing a boolean string x = x1 · · ·xN , and we would like to calculate
some function f(x) with as few quantum accesses to the black-box as possible. It is often easier to give
bounds on the query complexity than to the time complexity of a problem, and insights from the former
often prove useful in understanding the power and limitations of quantum computers. One famous example
is Grover’s algorithm for unstructured search [3]; by casting this problem into the query model it was shown
that Θ(
√
N) queries was required [4], proving that Grover’s algorithm is optimal.
Several methods have been proposed to bound the quantum query complexity. Upper bounds are almost
always proven by finding better query algorithms. Some general methods of constructing quantum algo-
rithms have been proposed, such as quantum walks [5, 6, 7, 8] and learning graphs [9]. For lower bounds,
the main methods are the polynomial method [10] and adversary method [11]. In particular, the general
adversary lower bound [12] has been shown to tightly characterize quantum query complexity [13, 14, 15],
but calculating such a tight bound seems difficult in general. Nevertheless, the general adversary lower
bound is valuable as a theoretical tool, for example in proving composition theorems [14, 15, 16] or showing
nonconstructive (!) upper bounds [16].
∗cedricl@mit.edu
†hanmas@mit.edu
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Our work
To improve our understanding of quantum query complexity, we introduce and study an alternative oracle
model, which we call the bomb oracle (see Section 3 for the precise definition). Our model is inspired by the
concept of interaction free measurements, illustrated vividly by the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem
[1], in which a property of a system can be measured without disturbing the system significantly. Like the
quantum oracle model, in the bomb oracle model we want to evaluate a function f(x) on a hidden boolean
string x = x1 · · ·xN while querying the oracle as few times as possible. In this model, however, the bomb
oracle is a controlled quantum oracle with the extra requirement that the algorithm fails if the controlled
query returns a 1. This seemingly impossible task can be tackled using the quantum Zeno effect [17], in a
fashion similar to the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb tester [18] (Section 2.1).
Our main result (Theorem 1) is that the bomb query complexity, B(f), is characterized by the square of
the quantum query complexity Q(f):
Theorem 1.
B(f) = Θ(Q(f)2). (1.1)
We prove the upper bound, B(f) = O(Q(f)2) (Theorem 3), by adapting Kwiat et al.’s solution of the
Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem (Section 2.1, [18]) to our model. We prove the lower bound, B(f) =
Ω(Q(f)2) (Theorem 4), by demonstrating that B(f) is lower bounded by the square of the general adversary
bound [12], (Adv±(f))2. The aforementioned result that the general adversary bound tightly characterizes
the quantum query complexity [13, 14, 15], Q(f) = Θ(Adv±(f)), allows us to draw our conclusion.
This characterization of Theorem 1 allows us to give nonconstructive upper bounds to the quantum query
complexity for some problems. For some functions f a bomb query algorithm is easily designed by adapting
a classical algorithm: specifically, we show that (stated informally):
Theorem 8 (informal). Suppose there is a classical algorithm that computes f(x) in T queries, and the
algorithm guesses the result of each query (0 or 1), making no more than an expected G mistakes for all x.
Then we can design a bomb query algorithm that uses O(TG) queries, and hence B(f) = O(TG). By our
characterization of Theorem 1, Q(f) = O(
√
TG).
This result inspired us to look for an explicit quantum algorithm that reproduces the query complexity
O(
√
TG). We were able to do so:
Theorem 9. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8, there is an explicit algorithm (Algorithm 11) for f with
query complexity O(
√
TG).
Using Algorithm 11, we were able to give an O(n3/2) algorithm for the single-source shortest paths
(SSSP) problem in an unweighted graph with n vertices, beating the best-known O(n3/2
√
logn) algorithm
[2]. A more striking application is our O(n7/4) algorithm for maximum bipartite matching; in this case
the best-known upper bound was the trivial O(n2), although the time complexity of this problem had been
studied in [19] (and similar problems in [20]).
Finally, in Section 7 we briefly discuss a related query complexity model, which we call the projective
query complexity P (f), in which each quantum query to x is immediately followed by a classical measurement
of the query result. This model seems interesting to us because its power lies between classical and quantum:
we observe that P (f) ≤ B(f) = Θ(Q(f)2) and Q(f) ≤ P (f) ≤ R(f), where R(f) is the classical randomized
query complexity. We note that Regev and Schiff [21] showed that P (OR) = Θ(N).
2
Past and related work
Mitchison and Jozsa have proposed a different computational model called counterfactual computation [22],
also based on interaction-free measurement. In counterfactual computation the result of a computation
may be learnt without ever running the computer. There has been some discussion on what constitutes
counterfactual computation; see for example [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
There have also been other applications of interaction-free measurement to quantum cryptography. For
example, Noh has proposed counterfactual quantum cryptography [30], where a secret key is distributed
between parties, even though a particle carrying secret information is not actually transmitted. More recently,
Brodutch et al. proposed an adaptive attack [31] on Wiesner’s quantum money scheme [32]; this attack is
directly based off Kwiat et al.’s solution of the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem [18].
Our Algorithm 11 is very similar to Kothari’s algorithm for the oracle identification problem [33], and
we refer to his analysis of the query complexity in our work.
The projective query model we detail in Section 7 was, to our knowledge, first considered by Aaronson
in unpublished work in 2002 [34].
Discussion and outlook
Our work raises a number of open questions. The most obvious ones are those pertaining to the application
of our recipe for turning classical algorithms into bomb algorithms, Theorem 8:
• Can we generalize our method to handle non-boolean input and output? If so, we might be able to find
better upper bounds for the adjacency-list model, or to study graph problems with weighted edges.
• Can our explicit (through Theorem 9) algorithm for maximum bipartite matching be made more time
efficient? The best known quantum algorithm for this task has time complexity O(n2 logn) in the
adjacency matrix model [19].
• Finally, can we find more upper bounds using Theorem 8? For example, could the query complexity
of the maximum matching problem on general nonbipartite graphs be improved with Theorem 8, by
analyzing the classical algorithm of Micali and Vazirani [35]?
Perhaps more fundamental, however, is the possibility that the bomb query complexity model will help
us understand the relationship between the classical randomized query complexity, R(f), and the quantum
query complexity Q(f). It is known [10] that for all total functions f , R(f) = O(Q(f)6); however, there is a
long-standing conjecture that actually R(f) = O(Q(f)2). In light of our results, this conjecture is equivalent
to the conjecture that R(f) = O(B(f)). Some more open questions, then, are the following:
• Can we say something about the relationship between R(f) and B(f) for specific classes of functions?
For example, is R(f) = O(B(f)2) for total functions?
• Referring to the notation of Theorem 8, we have B(f) = O(TG). Is the quantity G related to other
measures used in the study of classical decision-tree complexity, for example the certificate complexity,
sensitivity [36], block sensitivity [37], or (exact or approximate) polynomial degree? (For a review, see
[38].)
• What about other query complexity models that might help us understand the relationship between
R(f) and Q(f)? One possibility is the projective query complexity, P (f), considered in Section 7.
Regev and Schiff [21] have shown (as a special case of their results) that even with such an oracle,
P (OR) = Θ(N) queries are needed to evaluate the OR function.
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We hope that further study on the relationship between bomb and classical randomized complexity will
shed light on the power and limitations of quantum computation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem
The Elitzur-Vaidman bomb testing problem [1] is a well-known thought experiment to demonstrate how
quantum mechanics differs drastically from our classical perceptions. This problem demonstrates dramati-
cally the possibility of interaction free measurements, the possibility of a measurement on a property of a
system without disturbing the system.
The bomb-testing problem is as follows: assume we have a bomb that is either a dud or a live bomb.
The only way to interact with the bomb is to probe it with a photon: if the bomb is a dud, then the photon
passes through unimpeded; if the bomb is live, then the bomb explodes. We would like to determine whether
the bomb is live or not without exploding it. If we pass the photon through a beamsplitter before probing
the bomb, we can implement the controlled probe, pictured below:
|c〉 • |c〉
|0〉 I or X explodes if 1
(2.1)
The controlled gate is I if the bomb is a dud, and X if it is live. It was shown in [18] how to determine
whether a bomb was live with arbitrarily low probability of explosion by making use of the quantum Zeno
effect [17]. Specifically, writing R(θ) = exp(iθX) (the unitary operator rotating |0〉 to |1〉 in π/(2θ) steps),
the following circuit determines whether the bomb is live with failure probability O(θ):
|0〉 R(θ) • R(θ) •
|0〉 I or X . . . |0〉 I or X
π/(2θ) times in total
(2.2)
If the bomb is a dud, then the controlled probes do nothing, and repeated application of R(θ) rotates the
control bit from |0〉 to |1〉. If the bomb is live, the bomb explodes with O(θ2) probability in each application
of the probe, projecting the control bit back to |0〉. After O(1/θ) iterations the control bit stays in |0〉, with
only a O(θ) probability of explosion. Using O(1/θ) operations, we can thus tell a dud bomb apart from a
live one with only O(θ) probability of explosion.
2.2 Quantum query complexity
Throughout this paper, all functions f which we would like to calculate are assumed to have boolean input,
i.e. the domain is D ⊆ {0, 1}N .
For a boolean strings x ∈ {0, 1}N , the quantum oracle Ox is a unitary operator that acts on a one-qubit
record register and an N -dimensional index register as follows (⊕ is the XOR function):
Ox|r, i〉 = |r ⊕ xi, i〉 (2.3)
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|r〉
Ox
|r ⊕ xi〉
|i〉 |i〉
We want to determine the value of a boolean function f(x) using as few queries to the quantum oracle
Ox as possible. Algorithms for f have the general form as the following circuit, where the Ut’s are unitaries
independent of x:
U0
Ox
U1
Ox
U2
Ox
U3 . . .
The quantum query complexity Qδ(f) is the minumum number of applications of Ox’s in the circuit requried
to determine f(x) with error no more than δ for all x. By gap amplification (e.g. by performing the circuit
multiple rounds and doing majority voting), it can be shown that the choice of δ only affects the query
complexity by a log(1/δ) factor. We therefore often set δ = 0.01 and write Q0.01(f) as Q(f).
3 Bomb query complexity
In this section we introduce a new query complexity model, which we call the bomb query complexity. A
circuit in the bomb query model is a restricted quantum query circuit, with the following restrictions on the
usage of the quantum oracle:
1. We have an extra control register |c〉 used to control whether Ox is applied (we call the controlled
version COx):
COx|c, r, i〉 = |c, r ⊕ (c · xi), i〉. (3.1)
where · indicates boolean AND.
2. The record register, |r〉 in the definition of COx above, must contain |0〉 before COx is applied.
3. After COx is applied, the record register is immediately measured in the computational basis (giving
the answer c · xi), and the algorithm terminates immediately if a 1 is measured (if c ·xi = 1). We refer
to this as the bomb blowing up or the bomb exploding.
|c〉 • |c〉
|0〉
Ox
bomb explodes if c · xi = 1
|i〉 |i〉
(3.2)
We define the bomb query complexity Bǫ,δ(f) to be the minimum number of times the above circuit needs
to be applied in an algorithm such that the following hold for all input x:
• The algorithm reaches the end without the bomb exploding with probability at least 1 − ǫ. We refer
to the probability that the bomb explodes as the probability of explosion.
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• The total probability that the bomb either explodes or fails to output f(x) correctly is no more than
δ ≥ ǫ.
The above implies that the algorithm outputs the correct answer with probability at least 1− δ.
The effect of the above circuit is equivalent to applying the following projector on |c, i〉:
Mx = CPx,0 =
N∑
i=1
|0, i〉〈0, i|+
∑
xi=0
|1, i〉〈1, i| (3.3)
= I −
∑
xi=1
|1, i〉〈1, i|. (3.4)
CPx,0 (which we will just call Mx in our proofs later on) is the controlled version of Px,0, the projector
that projects onto the indices i on which xi = 0:
Px,0 =
∑
xi=0
|i〉〈i|. (3.5)
Thus Circuit 3.2 is equivalent to the following circuit :
|c〉 • |c〉
|i〉 Px,0 (1− c · xi)|i〉
(3.6)
In this notation, the square of the norm of a state is the probability that the state has survived to this stage,
i.e. the algorithm has not terminated. The norm of (1 − c · xi)|xi〉 is 1 if c · xi = 0 (the state survives this
stage), and 0 otherwise (the bomb blows up).
A general circuit in this model looks like the following:
U0
•
U1
•
U2
•
U3
Px,0 Px,0 Px,0
. . .
It is not at all clear that gap amplification can be done efficiently in the bomb query model to improve
the error δ; after all, repeating the circuit multiple times increases the chance that the bomb blows up.
However, it turns out that the complexity Bǫ,δ(f) is closely related to Qδ(f), and therefore the choice of δ
affects Bǫ,δ(f) by at most a log
2(1/δ) factor as long as δ ≥ ǫ (see Lemma 2). We therefore often omit δ by
setting δ = 0.01, and write Bǫ,0.01(f) as Bǫ(f). Sometimes we even omit the ǫ.
Finally, note that the definition of the bomb query complexity B(f) is inherently asymmetric with
respect to 0 and 1 in the input: querying 1 causes the bomb to blow up, while querying 0 is safe. In
Section 5.1, we define a symmetric bomb query model and its corresponding query complexity, B˜ǫ,δ(f). We
prove that this generalized symmetric model is asymptotically equivalent to the original asymmetric model,
B˜ǫ,δ(f) = Θ(Bǫ,δ(f)), in Lemma 5. This symmetric version of the bomb query complexity will turn out to
be useful in designing bomb query algorithms.
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4 Main result
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 1. For all functions f with boolean input alphabet, and numbers ǫ satisfying 0 < ǫ ≤ 0.01,
Bǫ,0.01(f) = Θ
(
Q0.01(f)
2
ǫ
)
. (4.1)
Here 0.01 can be replaced by any constant no more than 1/10.
Proof. The upper bound Bǫ,δ(f) = O(Qδ(f)2/ǫ) is proved in Theorem 3. The lower bound Bǫ,δ(f) =
Ω(Q0.01(f)
2/ǫ) is proved in Theorem 4.
Lemma 2. For all functions f with boolean input alphabet, and numbers ǫ, δ satisfying 0 < ǫ ≤ δ ≤ 1/10,
Bǫ,0.1(f) = O(Bǫ,δ(f)), Bǫ,δ(f) = O(Bǫ,0.1(f) log
2(1/δ)). (4.2)
In particular, if δ is constant,
Bǫ,δ(f) = Θ(Bǫ,0.1(f)). (4.3)
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 and the fact that Q0.1(f) = O(Qδ(f)) and Qδ(f) = O(Q0.1(f) log(1/δ)).
Because of this result, we will often omit the 0.01 in Bǫ,0.01 and write simply Bǫ.
4.1 Upper bound
Theorem 3. For all functions f with boolean input alphabet, and numbers ǫ, δ satisfying 0 < ǫ ≤ δ ≤ 1/10,
Bǫ,δ(f) = O(Qδ(f)
2/ǫ). (4.4)
The proof follows the solution of Elitzur-Vaidman bomb-testing problem ([18], or Section 2.1). By taking
advantage of the Quantum Zeno effect [17], using O(Q(f)ǫ ) calls to Mx, we can simulate one call to Ox with
probabilty of explosion O( ǫQ(f) ). Replacing all Ox queries with this construction results in a bounded error
algorithm with probability of explosion O( ǫQ(f)Q(f)) = O(ǫ).
Proof. Let θ = π/(2L) for some large positive integer L (chosen later), and let R(θ) be the rotation
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ

 (4.5)
We claim that with 2L calls to the bomb oracle Mx = CPx,0, we can simulate Ox by the following circuit
with probability of explosion less than π2/(2L) and error O(1/L).
|r〉 X |r ⊕ xi〉
|0〉 R(θ) • R(θ) • • R(−θ) • R(−θ) • |0〉 (discard)
|i〉 Px,0 . . . Px,0 Px,0 . . . Px,0 |i〉
L times in total L times in total (4.6)
In words, we simulate Ox acting on |r, i〉 by the following steps:
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1. Append an ancilla qubit |0〉, changing the state into |r, 0, i〉.
2. Repeat the following L times:
(a) apply R(θ) on the second register
(b) apply Mx on the third register controlled by the second register.
At this point, if the bomb hasn’t blown up, the second register should contain 1− xi.
3. Apply CNOT on the first register controlled by the second register; this copies 1 − xi to the first
register.
4. Apply a NOT gate to the first register.
5. Repeat the following L times to uncompute the second (ancilla) register :
(a) apply R(−θ) on the second register
(b) apply Mx on the third register controlled by second register
6. Discard the second (ancilla) register.
We now calculate explicitly the action of the circuit on an arbitrary state to confirm our claims above.
Consider how the circuit acts on the basis state |r, 0, i〉 (the second register being the appended ancilla). We
break into cases:
• If xi = 0, then Px,0|i〉 = |i〉, so the controlled projections do nothing. Thus in Step 2 the rotation
R(θ)L = R(π/2) is applied to the ancilla qubit, rotating it from 0 to 1. After Step 2 then, the state
is |r, 1, i〉. Step 3 and 4 together do not change the state, while Step 5 rotates the ancilla back to 0,
resulting in the final state |r, 0, i〉.
• If xi = 1, then Px,0|i〉 = 0, and
Mx|0, i〉 = |0, i〉, Mx|1, i〉 = 0 (for xi = 1) (4.7)
Therefore in Step 2 and Step 5, after each rotation R(±θ), the projection CPx,0 projects the ancilla
back to 0:
MxR(θ)|0, i〉 = Mx(cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉)|i〉 = cos θ|0, i〉 (for xi = 1) (4.8)
Each application of MxR(θ) thus has no change on the state other than to shrink its amplitude by
cos θ. The CNOT in Step 3 has no effect (since the ancilla stays in 0), and Step 4 maps |r〉 to |r ⊕ 1〉.
Since there are 2L applications of this shrinkage (in Step 2 and 5), the final state is cos2L θ|r ⊕ 1, 0, i〉.
We can now combine the two cases: by linearity, the application of the circuit on a general state∑
r,i ar,i|r, i〉 (removing the ancilla) is∑
r,i
ar,i|r, i〉 →
∑
r∈{0,1},xi=0
ar,i|r, i〉+
∑
r∈{0,1},xi=1
ar,i cos
2L(θ)|r ⊕ 1, i〉 (4.9)
=
∑
r,i
ar,i cos
2Lxi
( π
2L
)
|r ⊕ xi, i〉 ≡ |ψ′〉 (4.10)
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Thus the effect of this construction simulates the usual quantum oracle |r, i〉 → |r ⊕ xi, i〉 with blowing
up probability no more than
1− cos4L
( π
2L
)
≤ 1−
(
1− π
2
4L2
)2L
≤ π
2
2L
. (4.11)
Moreover, the difference between the output of our circuit, |ψ′〉, and the output on the quantum oracle,
|ψ〉 =∑r,i ar,i|r ⊕ xi, i〉, is
‖|ψ′〉 − |ψ〉‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
r∈{0,1},xi=1
ar,i(1− cos2L(θ))|r ⊕ 1, i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (4.12)
≤ 1− cos2L π
2L
≤ π
2
4L
. (4.13)
Given this construction, we can now prove our theorem. Suppose we are given a quantum algorithm that
finds f(x) with Qδ′(f) queries, making at most δ′ = δ − ǫ error. We construct an algorithm using bomb
oracles instead by replacing each of the applications of the quantum oracle Ox by our circuit construction
(4.6), where we choose
L =
⌈
π2
2ǫ
Qδ′(f)
⌉
(4.14)
Then the blowing up probability is no more than
π2
2L
Qδ′(f) ≤ ǫ (4.15)
and the difference between the final states, |ψf 〉 and
∣∣∣ψ′f〉, is at most
∥∥∣∣ψ′f〉− |ψf 〉∥∥ ≤ π24LQδ′(f) ≤ ǫ2 . (4.16)
Therefore∣∣〈ψ′f ∣∣P ∣∣ψ′f〉− 〈ψf |P |ψf 〉∣∣ ≤ ∣∣〈ψ′f ∣∣P ∣∣ψ′f〉− 〈ψf |P ∣∣ψ′f〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈ψ′f ∣∣P |ψf 〉 − 〈ψf |P |ψf 〉∣∣ (4.17)
≤ ∥∥∣∣ψ′f〉∥∥ ∥∥P (∣∣ψ′f〉− |ψf 〉)∥∥+ ∥∥P (∣∣ψ′f〉− |ψf 〉)∥∥ ‖|ψf 〉‖ (4.18)
≤ ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ (4.19)
for any projector P (in particular, the projector that projects onto the classical answer at the end of the
algorithm). The algorithm accumulates at most ǫ extra error at the end, giving a total error of no more than
δ′ + ǫ = δ. This algorithm makes 2LQδ′(f) < π
2
ǫ Q
2
δ′(f) + 2Qδ′(f) queries to the bomb oracle, and therefore
Bǫ,δ(f) <
π2
ǫ
Qδ−ǫ(f)
2 + 2Qδ−ǫ(f) (4.20)
= O
(
Qδ−ǫ(f)
2
ǫ
)
. (4.21)
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From this we can derive that Bǫ,δ(f) = O(Qδ(f)2/ǫ):
Bǫ,δ(f) < Bǫ/2,δ(f) (4.22)
= O
(
Qδ−ǫ/2(f)
2
ǫ
)
, by 4.21 (4.23)
= O
(
Qδ(f)
2
ǫ
)
, since
δ
2
≥ δ − ǫ
2
. (4.24)
4.2 Lower bound
Theorem 4. For all functions f with boolean input alphabet, and numbers ǫ, δ satisfying 0 < ǫ ≤ δ ≤ 1/10,
Bǫ,δ(f) = Ω(Q0.01(f)
2/ǫ). (4.25)
The proof of this result uses the generalized adversary bound Adv±(f) [12]: we show that Bǫ(f) =
Ω(Adv±(f)2/ǫ), and then use the known result that Q(f) = O(Adv±(f)) [15]. The complete proof is given
in Appendix A.
5 Generalizations and Applications
We now discuss applications of the result Bǫ(f) = Θ(Q(f)2/ǫ) that could be useful.
5.1 Generalizing the bomb query model
We consider modifying the bomb query model as follows. We require that the input string x can only be
accessed by the following circuit:
|c〉 • • |c〉
|0〉
Ox
bomb explodes if 1
|i〉 |i〉
|a〉 •
(5.1)
Compare with Circuit 3.2; the difference is that there is now an extra register |a〉, and the bomb explodes
only if both xi = a and the control bit is 1. In other words, the bomb explodes if c · (xi ⊕ a) = 1. The three
registers c, i, and a are allowed to be entangled, however. If we discard the second register afterwards, the
effect of this circuit, written as a projector, is
M˜x =
∑
i∈[N ],a∈{0,1}
|0, i, a〉〈0, i, a|+
∑
i,a:xi=a
|1, i, a〉〈1, i, a|. (5.2)
Let B˜ǫ,δ(f) be the required number of queries to this modified bomb oracle M˜x to calculate f(x) with error
no more than δ, with a probability of explosion no more than ǫ. Using Theorem 1, we show that B˜ and B
are equivalent up to a constant:
Lemma 5. If f : D → E, where D ⊆ {0, 1}N , and δ ≤ 1/10 is a constant, then Bǫ,δ(f) = Θ(B˜ǫ,δ(f)).
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Proof. It should be immediately obvious that Bǫ,δ(f) ≥ B˜ǫ,δ(f), since a query in the B model can be
simulated by a query in the B˜ model by simply setting a = 0. In the following we show that Bǫ,δ(f) =
O(B˜ǫ,δ(f)).
For each string x ∈ {0, 1}N , define the string x˜ ∈ {0, 1}2N by concatenating two copies of x and flipping
every bit of the second copy. In other words,
x˜i =
{
xi if i ≤ N
1− xi−N if i > N
. (5.3)
Let D˜ = {x˜ : x ∈ D}. Given a function f : D → {0, 1}, define f˜ : D˜ → {0, 1} by f˜(x˜) = f(x).
We claim that a B˜ query to x can be simulated by a B query to x˜. This can be seen by comparing M˜x:
M˜x =
∑
i∈[N ],a
|0, i, a〉〈0, i, a|+
∑
i∈[N ],a:xi=a
|1, i, a〉〈1, i, a|. (5.4)
and Mx˜:
Mx˜ =
∑
i˜∈[2N ]
∣∣0, i˜〉〈0, i˜∣∣+ ∑
i˜∈[2N ]:x˜i=0
∣∣1, i˜〉〈1, i˜∣∣. (5.5)
Recalling the definition of x˜ in 5.3, we see that these two projectors are exactly equal if we encode i˜ as (i, a),
where i ≡ i˜ mod N and a = ⌊i/N⌋.
Since f˜(x˜) = f(x), we thus have B˜ǫ,δ(f) = Bǫ,δ(f˜). Our result then readily follows; it can easily be
checked that Q(f) = Q(f˜), and therefore by Theorem 1,
B˜ǫ,δ(f) = Bǫ,δ(f˜) = Θ
(
Q(f˜)2
ǫ
)
= Θ
(
Q(f)2
ǫ
)
(5.6)
There are some advantages to allowing the projector M˜x instead of Mx. First of all, the inputs 0 and
1 in x are finally manifestly symmetric, unlike that in Mx (the bomb originally blew up if xi = 1, but not
if xi = 0). Moreover, we now allow the algorithm to guess an answer to the query (this answer may be
entangled with the index register i), and the bomb blows up only if the guess is wrong, controlled on c. This
flexibility may allow more leeway in designing algorithms for the bomb query model, as we soon utilize.
5.2 Using classical algorithms to design bomb query algorithms
We now demonstrate the possibility that we can prove nonconstructive upper bounds on Q(f) for some
functions f , by creating bomb query algorithms and using that Q(f) = Θ(
√
ǫBǫ(f)). Consider for example
the following classical algorithm for the OR function:
Algorithm 6 (Classical algorithm for OR). Pick some arbitrary ordering of the N bits, and query them
one by one, terminating as soon as a 1 is seen. Return 1 if a 1 was queried; otherwise return 0.
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We can convert this immediately to a bomb query algorithm for OR, by using the construction in the
proof of Theorem 3. That construction allows us to implement the operation Ox in O(ǫ−1) queries, with
O(ǫ) error and probability of explosion if xi = 1 (but no error if xi = 0). Thus we have the following:
Algorithm 7 (Bomb algorithm for OR). Query the N bits one-by-one, and apply the construction of
Theorem 3 one bit at a time, using O(1/ǫ) operations each time. Terminate as soon as a 1 is seen, and
return 1; otherwise return 0 if all bits are 0.
Since the algorithm ends as soon as a 1 is found, the algorithm only accumulates ǫ error in total. Thus
this shows Bǫ(OR) = O(N/ǫ).
Note, however, that we have already shown that Q(f) = Θ(
√
ǫBǫ(f)) for boolean f . An O(N/ǫ) bomb
query algorithm for OR therefore implies that Q(OR) = O(
√
N). We have showed the existence of an
O(
√
N) quantum algorithm for the OR function, without actually constructing one!
We formalize the intuition in the above argument by the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Let f : D → E, where D ⊆ {0, 1}N . Suppose there is a classical randomized query algorithm
A, that makes at most T queries, and evaluates f with bounded error. Let the query results of A on random
seed sA be xp1 , xp2 , · · · , xpT˜ (x) , T˜ (x) ≤ T , where x is the hidden query string.
Suppose there is another (not necessarily time-efficient) randomized algorithm G, with random seed sG ,
which takes as input xp1 , · · · , xpt−1 and sA, and outputs a guess for the next query result xpt of A. Assume
that G makes no more than an expected total of G mistakes (for all inputs x). In other words,
IEsA,sG


T˜ (x)∑
t=1
∣∣G(xp1 , · · · , xpt−1 , sA, sG)− xpt ∣∣

 ≤ G ∀x. (5.7)
Note that G is given the random seed sA of A, so it can predict the next query index of A.
Then Bǫ(f) = O(TG/ǫ), and thus (by Theorem 1) Q(f) = O(
√
TG).
As an example, in our simple classical example for OR we have T = N (the algorithm takes at most
N steps) and G = 1 (the guessing algorithm always guesses the next query to be 0; since the algorithm
terminates on a 1, it makes at most one mistake).
Proof of theorem 8. We generalize the argument in the OR case. We take the classical algorithm and replace
each classical query by the construction of Theorem 3, using O(G/ǫ) bomb queries each time. On each query,
the bomb has a O(ǫ/G) chance of exploding when the guess is wrong, and no chance of exploding when the
guess is correct. Therefore the total probability of explosion is O(ǫ/G) · G = O(ǫ). The total number of
bomb queries used is O(TG/ǫ).
For the full technical proof, see Appendix B.
5.3 Explicit quantum algorithm for Theorem 8
In this section we give an explicit quantum algorithm, in the setting of Theorem 8, that reproduces the given
query complexity. This algorithm is very similar to the one given by R. Kothari for the oracle identification
problem [33].
Theorem 9. Under the assumptions of Theorem 8, there is an explicit quantum algorithm for f with query
complexity O(
√
TG).
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Proof. We will construct this algorithm (Algorithm 11) shortly. We need the following quantum search
algorithm as a subroutine:
Theorem 10 (Finding the first marked element in a list). Suppose there is an ordered list of N elements,
and each element is either marked or unmarked. Then there is a bounded-error quantum algorithm for finding
the first marked element in the list (or determines that no marked elements exist), such that:
• If the first marked element is the d-th element of the list, then the algorithm uses an expected O(√d)
time and queries.
• If there are no marked elements, then the algorithm uses O(√N) time and queries, but always deter-
mines correctly that no marked elements exist.
This algorithm is straightforward to derive given the result in [39], and was already used in Kothari’s
algorithm [33]. We give the algorithm (Algorithm 28) and its analysis in Appendix C.
We now give our explicit quantum algorithm.
Algorithm 11 (Simulating a classical query algorithm by a quantum one).
Input. Classical randomized algorithm A that computes f with bounded error. Classical randomized algo-
rithm G that guesses queries of A. Oracle Ox for the hidden string x.
Output. f(x) with bounded error.
The quantum algorithm proceeds by attempting to produce the list of queries and results that A would
have made. More precisely, given a randomly chosen random seed sA, the quantum algorithm outputs (with
constant error) a list of pairs (p1(x), xp1(x)), · · · , (pT˜ (x)(x), xT˜ (x)pi(x)). This list is such that on random seed
sA, the i-th query algorithm of A is made at the position pi(x), and the query result is xpi(x). The quantum
algorithm then determines the output of A using this list.
The main idea for the algorithm is this: we first assume that the guesses made by G are correct. By
repeatedly feeding the output of G back into A and G, we can obtain a list of query values for A without any
queries to the actual black box. We then search for the first deviation of the string x from the predictions of
G; assuming the first deviation is the d1-th query, by Theorem 10 the search takes O(
√
d1) queries (ignoring
error for now). We then know that all the guesses made by G are correct up to the (d1 − 1)-th query, and
incorrect for the d1-th query.
With the corrected result of the first d1 queries, we now continue by assuming again the guesses made by
G are correct starting from the (d1 +1)-th query, and search for the location of the next deviation, d2. This
takes O(
√
d2 − d1) queries; we then know that all the guesses made by G are correct from the (d1 + 1)-th to
(d2 − 1)-th query, and incorrect for the d2-th one. Continuing in this manner, we eventually determine all
query results of A after an expected G iterations.
We proceed to spell out our algorithm. For the time being, we assume that algorithm for Theorem 10
has no error and thus requires no error reduction.
1. Initialize random seeds sA and sG for A and G. We will simulate the behavior of A and G on these
random seeds. Initialize d = 0. d is such that we have determined the values of all query results of A
up to the d-th query. Also initialize an empty list L of query pairs.
2. Repeat until either all query results of A are determined, or 100G iterations of this loop have been
executed:
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(a) Assuming that G always guesses correctly starting from the (d+1)-th query, compute from A and
G a list of query positions pd+1, pd+2, · · · and results a˜d+1, a˜d+2, · · · . This requires no queries to
the black box.
(b) Using our algorithm for finding the first marked element (Theorem 10, Algorithm 28), find the
first index d∗ > d such that the actual query result of A differs from the guess by G, i.e. xpd 6= a˜d;
or return that no such d∗ exists. This takes O(
√
d∗ − d) time in the former case, and O(√T − d)
time in the latter.
(c) We break into cases:
i. If an index d∗ was found in Step 2b, then the algorithm decides the next mistake made by G
is at position d∗. It thus adds the query pairs (pd+1, a˜d+1), · · · , (pd∗−1, a˜d∗−1), and the pair
(pd∗ , 1− a˜d∗), to the list L. Also set d = d∗.
ii. If no index d∗ was found in Step 2b, the algorithm decides that all remaining guesses by G are
correct. Thus the query pairs (pd+1, a˜d+1), · · · , (pT˜ (x), a˜T˜ (x)) are added to L, where T˜ (x) ≤ T
is the number of queries made by A.
3. If the algorithm found all query results of A in 100G iterations of step 2, use L to calculate the output
of A; otherwise the algorithm fails.
We now count the total number of queries. Suppose g ≤ 100G is the number of iterations of Step 2; if
all query results have been determined, g is the number of wrong guesses by G. Say the list of d’s found is
d0 = 0, d1, · · · , dg. Let dg+1 = T . Step 2 is executed for g + 1 times, and the total number of queries is
O
(
g+1∑
i=1
√
di − di−1
)
= O
(√
Tg
)
= O
(√
TG
)
(5.8)
by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
We now analyze the error in our algorithm. The first source of error is cutting off the loop in Step 2: by
Markov’s inequality, for at least 99% of random seeds sG , sG , G makes no more than 100G wrong guesses.
For these random seeds all query results of A are determined. Cutting off the loop thus gives at most 0.01
error.
The other source of error is the error of Algorithm 28 used in Step 2b: we had assumed that it could be
treated as zero-error, but we now remove this assumption. Assuming each iteration gives error δ′, the total
error accrued could be up to O(gδ′). It seems as if we would need to set δ′ = O(1/G) for the total error to
be constant, and thus gain an extra logarithmic factor in the query complexity.
However, in his paper for oracle identification [33], Kothari showed that multiple calls to Algorithm 28
can be composed to obtain a bounded-error algorithm based on span programs without an extra logarithmic
factor in the query complexity; refer to [33, Section 3] for details. Therefore we can replace the iterations
of Step 2 with Kothari’s span program construction and get a bounded error algorithm with complexity
O(
√
TG).
Note that while Algorithm 11 has query complexity O(
√
TG), the time complexity may be much higher.
After all, Algorithm 11 proceeds by simulating A query-by-query, although the number of actual queries to
the oracle is smaller. Whether or not we can get a algorithm faster than A using this approach may depend
on the problem at hand.
14
6 Improved upper bounds on quantum query complexity
We now use Theorem 9 to improve the quantum query complexity of certain graph problems.
6.1 Single source shortest paths for unweighted graphs
Problem 12 (Single source shortest paths (SSSP) for unweighted graphs). The adjacency matrix of a
directed graph n-vertex graph G is provided as a black box; a query on the pair (v, w) returns 1 if there is
an edge from v to w, and 0 otherwise. We are given a fixed vertex vstart. Call the length of a shortest path
from vstart to another vertex w the distance dw of w from vstart; if no path exists, define dw =∞. Our task
is to find dw for all vertices w in G.
In this section we shall show the following:
Theorem 13. The quantum query complexity of single-source shortest paths in an unweighted graph is
Θ(n3/2) in the adjacency matrix model.
Proof. The lower bound of Ω(n3/2) is known [40]. We show the upper bound by applying Theorem 9 to a
classical algorithm. The following well-known classical algorithm (commonly known as breadth first search,
BFS) solves this problem:
Algorithm 14 (Classical algorithm for unweighted SSSP).
1. Initialize dw := ∞ for all vertices w 6= vstart, dvstart := 0, and L := (vstart). L is the ordered list of
vertices for which we have determined the distances, but whose outgoing edges we have not queried.
2. Repeat until L is empty:
• Let v be the first (in order of time added to L) vertex in L. For all vertices w such that dw =∞:
– Query (v, w).
– If (v, w) is an edge, set dw := dv + 1 and add w to the end of L.
• Remove v from L.
We omit the proof of correctness of this algorithm (see for example [41]). This algorithm uses up to
T = O(n2) queries. If the guessing algorithm always guesses that (v, w) is not an edge, then it makes at
most G = n− 1 mistakes; hence Q(f) = O(√TG) = O(n3/2).1
The previous best known quantum algorithm for unweighted SSSP, to our best knowledge, was given by
Furrow [2]; that algorithm has query complexity O(n3/2
√
logn).
We now consider the quantum query complexity of unweighted k-source shortest paths (finding k shortest-
path trees rooted from k beginning vertices). If we apply Algorithm 14 on k different starting vertices, then
the expected number of wrong guesses is no more than G = k(n− 1); however, the total number of edges we
query need not exceed T = O(n2), since an edge never needs to be queried more than once. Therefore
Corollary 15. The quantum query complexity of unweighted k-source shortest paths in the adjacency matrix
model is O(k1/2n3/2), where n is the number of vertices.
We use this idea – that T need not exceed O(n2) when dealing with graph problems – again in the
following section.
1It seems difficult to use our method to give a corresponding result for the adjacency list model; after all, the result of a
query is much harder to guess when the input alphabet is non-boolean.
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6.2 Maximum bipartite matching
Problem 16 (Maximum bipartite matching). We are given as black box the adjacency matrix of an n-vertex
bipartite graph G = (V = X ∪ Y,E), where the undirected set of edges E only run between the bipartite
components X and Y . A matching of G is a list of edges of G that do not share vertices. Our task is to find
a maximum matching of G, i.e. a matching that contains the largest possible number of edges.
In this section we show that
Theorem 17. The quantum query complexity of maximum bipartite matching is O(n7/4) in the adjacency
matrix model, where n is the number of vertices.
Proof. Once again we apply Theorem 9 to a classical algorithm. Classically, this problem is solved in
O(n5/2) time by the Hopcroft-Karp [42] algorithm (here n = |V |). We summarize the algorithm as follows
(this summary roughly follows that of [19]):
Algorithm 18 (Hopcroft-Karp algorithm for maximum bipartite matching [42]).
1. Initialize an empty matching M. M is a matching that will be updated until it is maximum.
2. Repeat the following steps until M is a maximum matching:
(a) Define the directed graph H = (V ′, E′) as follows:
V ′ = X ∪ Y ∪ {s, t}
E′ = {(s, x) | x ∈ X, (x, y) 6∈ M for all y ∈ Y }
∪ {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, (x, y) ∈ E, (x, y) 6∈ M}
∪ {(y, x) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, (x, y) ∈ E, (x, y) ∈M}
∪ {(y, t) | y ∈ Y, (x, y) 6∈ M for all x ∈ X} (6.1)
where s and t are two extra auxilliary vertices. Note that if (s, x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xℓ, yℓ, t) is a path
in H from s to t, then xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y for all i. Additionally, the edges (aside from the first
and last) alternate from being in M and not being in M: (xi, yi) 6∈ M, (yi, xi+1) ∈ M. Such a
path is called an augmenting path in the literature.
We note that a query to the adjacency matrix of E′ can be simulated by a query to the adjacency
matrix of E.
(b) Using the breadth-first search algorithm (Algorithm 14), in the graph H , find the length of the
shortest path, or distance, of all vertices from s. Let the distance from s to t be 2ℓ+ 1.
(c) Find a maximal set S of vertex-disjoint shortest paths from s to t in the graph H . In other words,
S should be a list of paths from s to t such that each path has length 2ℓ+1, and no pair of paths
share vertices except for s and t. Moreover, all other shortest paths from s to t share at least
one vertex (except for s and t) with a path in S. We describe how to find such a maximal set in
Algorithm 19.
(d) If S is empty, the matching M is a maximum matching, and we terminate. Otherwise continue:
(e) Let (s, x1, y1, x2, y2, · · · , xℓ, yℓ, t) be a path in S. Remove the ℓ− 1 edges (xi+1, yi) from M, and
insert the ℓ edges (xi, yi) into M. This increases |M| by 1. Repeat for all paths in S; there are
no conflicts since the paths in S are vertex-disjoint.
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Once again, we omit the proof of correctness of this algorithm; the correctness is guaranteed by Berge’s
Lemma [43], which states that a matching is maximum if there are no more augmenting paths for the
matching. Moreover, O(
√
n) iterations of Step 2 suffice [42].
We now describe how to find a maximal set of shortest-length augmenting paths in Step 2(c). This
algorithm is essentially a modified version of depth-first search:
Algorithm 19 (Finding a maximal set of vertex-disjoint shortest-length augmenting paths).
Input. The directed graph H defined in Algorithm 18, as well as the distances dv of all vertices v from s
(calculated in Step 2(b) of Algorithm 18).
1. Initialize a set of paths S := ∅, set of vertices R := {s}, and a stack2 of vertices L := (s). L contains
the ordered list of vertices that we have begun, but not yet finished, processing. R is the set of vertices
that we have processed. S is the set of vertex-disjoint shortest-length augmenting paths that we have
found.
2. Repeat until L is empty:
(a) If the vertex in the front of L is t, we have found a new vertex-disjoint path from s to t:
• Trace the path from t back to s by removing elements from the front of L until s is at the
front. Add the corresponding path to S.
• Start again from the beginning of Step 2.
(b) Let v be the vertex in the front of L (i.e. the vertex last added to, and still in, L). Recall the
distance from s to v is dv.
(c) Find w such that w 6∈ R, dw = dv + 1, and (v, w) (as an edge in H) has not been queried in this
algorithm. If no such vertex w exists, remove v from L and start from the beginning of Step 2.
(d) Query (v, w) on the graph H .
(e) If (v, w) is an edge, add w to the front of L. If w 6= t, add w to R.
3. Output S, the maximal set of vertex-disjoint shortest-length augmenting paths.
We now return to Algorithm 18 and count T and G. There is obviously no need to query the same edge
more than once, so T = O(n2). If the algorithm always guesses, on a query (v, w), that there is no edge
between (v, w), then it makes at most G = O(n3/2) mistakes: in Step 2(b) there are at most O(n) mistakes
(see Algorithm 14), while in Step 2(c)/Algorithm 19 there is at most one queried edge leading to each vertex
aside from t, and edges leading to t can be computed without queries to G. Since Step 2 is executed O(
√
n)
times, our counting follows.
Thus there is a quantum query algorithm with complexity Q = O(
√
TG) = O(n7/4).
To our knowledge, this is the first known nontrivial upper bound on the query complexity of maximum
bipartite matching.3 The time complexity of this problem was studied by Ambainis and Spalek in [19]; they
gave an upper bound of O(n2 logn) time in the adjacency matrix model. A lower bound of Ω(n3/2) for the
query complexity of this problem was given in [44, 45].
For readers familiar with network flow, the arguments in this section also apply to Dinic’s algorithm for
maximum flow [46] on graphs with unit capacity, i.e. where the capacity of each edge is 0 or 1. On graphs with
2A stack is a data structure such that elements that are first inserted into the stack are removed last.
3The trivial upper bound is O(n2), where all pairs of vertices are queried.
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unit capacity, Dinic’s algorithm is essentially the same as Hopcroft-Karp’s, except that augmenting paths
are over a general, nonbipartite flow network. (The set S in Step 2(c) of Algorithm 18 is generally referred
to as a blocking flow in this context.) It can be shown that only O(min{m1/2, n2/3}) iterations of Step 2 are
required [47, 48], where m is the number of edges of the graph. Thus T = O(n2), G = O(min{m1/2, n2/3}n),
and therefore
Theorem 20. The quantum query complexity of the maximum flow problem in graphs with unit capacity is
O(min{n3/2m1/4, n11/6}), where n and m are the number of vertices and edges in the graph, respectively.
It is an open question whether a similar result for maximum matching in a general nonbipartite graph
can be proven, perhaps by applying Theorem 9 to the classical algorithm of Micali and Vazirani [35].
7 Projective query complexity
We end this paper with a brief discussion on another query complexity model, which we will call the projective
query complexity. This model is similar to the bomb query model in that the only way of accessing xi is
through a classical measurement; however, in the projective query model the algorithm does not terminate if
a 1 is measured. Our motivation for considering the projective query model is that its power is intermediate
between the classical and quantum query models. To the best of our knowledge, this model was first
considered in 2002 in unpublished results by S. Aaronson [34].
A circuit in the projective query complexity model is a restricted quantum query circuit, with the following
restrictions on the use of the quantum oracle:
1. We have an extra control register |c〉 used to control whether Ox is applied (we call the controlled
version COx):
COx|c, r, i〉 = |c, r ⊕ (c · xi), i〉. (7.1)
where · indicates boolean AND.
2. The record register, |r〉 in the definition of COx above, must contain |0〉 before COx is applied.
3. After COx is applied, the record register is immediately measured in the computational basis, giving
the answer c · xi. The result, a classical bit, can then be used to control further quantum unitaries
(although only controlling the next unitary is enough, since the classical bit can be stored).
|c〉 • |c〉
|0〉
Ox
c · xi
|i〉 |i〉
(7.2)
We wish to evaluate a function f(x) with as few calls to this projective oracle as possible. Let the number
of oracle calls required to evaluate f(x), with at most δ error, be Pδ(f). By gap amplification, the choice of
δ only affects Pδ(f) by a factor of log(1/δ), and thus we will often omit δ.
We can compare the definition in this section with the definition of the bomb query complexity in Section
3: the only difference is that if c · xi = 1, the algorithm terminates in the bomb model, while the algorithm
can continue in the projective model. Therefore the following is evident:
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Observation 21. Pδ(f) ≤ Bǫ,δ(f), and therefore P (f) = O(Q(f)2).
Moreover, it is clear that the projective query model has power intermediate between classical and
quantum (a controlled query in the usual quantum query model can be simulated by appending a 0 to the
input string), and therefore letting Rδ(f) be the classical randomized query complexity,
Observation 22. Qδ(f) ≤ Pδ(f) ≤ Rδ(f).
For explicit bounds on P , Regev and Schiff [21] have shown that for computing the OR function, the
projective query complexity loses the Grover speedup:
Theorem 23 ([21]). P (OR) = Ω(N).
Note that this result says nothing about P (AND), since the definition of P (f) is asymmetric with respect
to 0 and 1 in the input.4
We observe that there could be a separation in both parts of the inequality Q ≤ P ≤ B:
Q(OR) = Θ(
√
N), P (OR) = Θ(N), B(OR) = Θ(N) (7.3)
Q(PARITY ) = Θ(N), P (PARITY ) = Θ(N), B(PARITY ) = Θ(N2) (7.4)
In the latter equation we used the fact that Q(PARITY ) = Θ(N) [10]. It therefore seems difficult to adapt
our lower bound method in Section 4.2 to P (f).
It would be interesting to find a general lower bound for P (f), or to establish more clearly the relationship
between Q(f), P (f), and R(f).
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A Proof of the adversary lower bound for B(f) (Theorem 4)
Before we give the proof of the general result that B(f) = Ω(Q(f)2) (Theorem 4)), we will illustrate the
proof by means of an example, the special case where f is the AND function.
Theorem 24. For δ < 1/10, Bǫ,δ(AND) = Ω(
N
ǫ ).
Proof. Let
∣∣ψ0t 〉 be the unnormalized state of the algorithm with x = 1n, and ∣∣ψkt 〉 be the unnormalized
state with x = 1 · · · 101 · · ·1, xk = 0, right before the (t+ 1)-th call to Mx. Then∣∣ψxt+1〉 = Ut+1Mx|ψxt 〉 (A.1)
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for some unitary Ut+1. For ease of notation, we’ll write M0 ≡M1n and Mk = M1···101···1, where the k-th bit
is 0 in the latter case. When acting on the control and index bits,
M0 =
N∑
i=1
|0, i〉〈0, i|
Mk =
N∑
i=1
|0, i〉〈0, i|+ |1, k〉〈1, k|. (A.2)
Since the Mi’s are projectors, M2i = Mi. Define
ǫit =
〈
ψit
∣∣(I −Mi)∣∣ψit〉, i = 0, 1, · · · , N. (A.3)
Note that 〈ψit+1|ψit+1〉 =
〈
ψit
∣∣M2i ∣∣ψit〉 = 〈ψit∣∣Mi∣∣ψit〉 = 〈ψit|ψit〉 − ǫit, for all i = 0, · · · , N (including 0!), and
hence
T−1∑
t=0
ǫit = 〈ψi0|ψi0〉 − 〈ψiT |ψiT 〉 ≤ ǫ. (A.4)
We now define the progress function. Let
W kt = 〈ψ0t |ψkt 〉 (A.5)
and let the progress function be a sum over W k’s:
Wt =
N∑
k=1
W kt =
N∑
k=1
〈ψ0t |ψkt 〉. (A.6)
We can lower bound the total change in the progress function by (see [11] for a proof; their proof equally
applies to unnormalized states)
W0 −WT ≥ (1 − 2
√
δ(1− δ))N. (A.7)
We now proceed to upper bound W0 −WT . Note that
W kt −W kt+1 = 〈ψ0t |ψkt 〉 −
〈
ψ0t
∣∣M0Mk∣∣ψkt 〉
=
〈
ψ0t
∣∣(I −M0)Mk∣∣ψkt 〉+ 〈ψ0t ∣∣M0(I −Mk)∣∣ψkt 〉+ 〈ψ0t ∣∣(I −M0)(I −Mk)∣∣ψkt 〉 (A.8)
and since (I −M0)Mk = 0, M0(I −Mk) = |1, k〉〈1, k|, we have
W kt −W kt+1 ≤ 〈ψ0t |1, k〉〈1, k|ψkt 〉+
∥∥(I −M0)∣∣ψ0t 〉∥∥ ∥∥(I −Mk)∣∣ψkt 〉∥∥
≤ ∥∥〈1, k|ψ0t 〉∥∥+√ǫ0t ǫkt . (A.9)
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where we used A.3. Summing over k and t, we obtain
W0 −WT =
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
[∥∥〈1, k|ψ0t 〉∥∥+√ǫ0t ǫkt
]
≤
√
TN
√√√√T−1∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
〈ψ0t |1, k〉〈1, k|ψ0t 〉+
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
k=1
ǫ0t + ǫ
k
t
2
≤
√
TN
√√√√T−1∑
t=0
〈ψ0t |(I −M0)|ψ0t 〉+Nǫ
≤
√√√√TN T−1∑
t=0
ǫ0t +Nǫ
≤
√
ǫTN +Nǫ (A.10)
where in the second line we used Cauchy-Schwarz and the AM-GM inequality. Combined with W0 −WT ≥
(1− 2√δ(1− δ))N (Eq. A.7), this immediately gives us
T ≥ (1− 2
√
δ(1− δ)− ǫ)2N
ǫ
. (A.11)
We now proceed to prove the general result. This proof follows the presentation given in A. Childs’s
online lecture notes [49], which we found quite illuminating.
Theorem 4. For all functions f with boolean input alphabet, and numbers ǫ, δ satisfying 0 < ǫ ≤ δ ≤ 1/10,
Bǫ,δ(f) = Ω(Q0.01(f)
2/ǫ). (A.12)
Proof. We prove the lower bound on Bǫ,δ by showing that it is lower bounded by Ω(Adv±(f)2/ǫ), where
Adv±(f) is the generalized (i.e. allowing negative weights) adversary bound [12] for f . We can then derive
our theorem from the result [15] that Q(f) = O(Adv±(f)).
We generalize the bound on the f = AND case to an adversary bound for Bǫ,δ on arbitrary f . Define
the projectors
Π0 =
N∑
i=1
|0, i〉〈0, i|
Πi = |1, i〉〈1, i|, i = 1, · · · , n. (A.13)
It is clear that
Π0 +
N∑
i=1
Πi = I. (A.14)
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Note that Mx = CPx,0 is
Mx = Π0 +
∑
i:xi=0
Πi. (A.15)
Define |ψxt 〉 as the state of the algorithm right before the (t+ 1)-th query with input x; then∣∣ψxt+1〉 = Ut+1Mx|ψxt 〉 (A.16)
for some unitary Ut+1. Now if we let
ǫxt = 〈ψxt |(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉 (A.17)
then it follows that 〈ψxt |ψxt 〉 − 〈ψxt+1|ψxt+1〉 = ǫxt , and thus
T−1∑
t=0
ǫxt = 〈ψx0 |ψx0 〉 − 〈ψxT |ψxT 〉 ≤ ǫ. (A.18)
We proceed to define the progress function. Let S be the set of allowable input strings x. Let Γ be an
adversary matrix, i.e. an S × S matrix such that
1. Γxy = Γyx ∀x, y ∈ S; and
2. Γxy = 0 if f(x) = f(y).
Let a be the normalized eigenvector of Γ with eigenvalue ±‖Γ‖, where ±‖Γ‖ is the largest (by absolute value)
eigenvalue of Γ. Define the progress function
Wt =
∑
x,y∈S
Γxya
∗
xay〈ψxt |ψyt 〉. (A.19)
For ǫ ≤ δ < 1/10 we have that5 (see [12] for a proof; their proof applies equally well to unnormalized states)
|W0 −WT | ≥ (1 − 2
√
δ(1 − δ)− 2δ)‖Γ‖ (A.20)
We now proceed to upper bound |W0 −WT | ≤
∑
t |Wt −Wt−1|. Note that
Wt −Wt+1 =
∑
x,y∈S
Γxya
∗
xay
(〈ψxt |ψyt 〉 − 〈ψxt+1|ψyt+1〉)
=
∑
x,y∈S
Γxya
∗
xay (〈ψxt |ψyt 〉 − 〈ψxt |MxMy|ψyt 〉)
=
∑
x,y∈S
Γxya
∗
xay (〈ψxt |(I −Mx)My|ψyt 〉+ 〈ψxt |Mx(I −My)|ψyt 〉+ 〈ψxt |(I −Mx)(I −My)|ψyt 〉)
(A.21)
5As described in [12], the 2δ term can be removed if the output is boolean (0 or 1).
25
We bound the three terms separately. For the first two terms, use
(I −Mx)My =
∑
i:xi=1,yi=0
Πi
= (I −Mx)
∑
i:xi 6=yi
Πi (A.22)
Define the S × S matrix Γi as
Γi =
{
Γxy if xi 6= yi
0 if xi = yi
(A.23)
The first term of A.21 is
∑
x,y∈S
∑
i:xi 6=yi
Γxya
∗
xay〈ψxt |(I −Mx)Πi|ψyt 〉 =
∑
x,y∈S
N∑
i=1
(Γi)xy a
∗
xay〈ψxt |(I −Mx)Πi|ψyt 〉
=
N∑
i=1
tr(QiΓiQ˜
†
i ) (A.24)
where
Qi =
∑
x∈S
axΠi|ψxt 〉〈x| (A.25)
Q˜i =
∑
x∈S
axΠi(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉〈x|. (A.26)
Although both Qi and Q˜i depend on t, we suppress the t dependence in the notation. Similarly, the second
term of A.21 is equal to
∑N
i=1 tr(Q˜iΓiQ
†
i ). We can also rewrite the third term of A.21 as∑
x,y∈S
Γxya
∗
xay〈ψxt |(I −Mx)(I −My)|ψyt 〉 = tr(Q′ΓQ′†) (A.27)
where
Q′ =
∑
x∈S
ax(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉〈x|. (A.28)
Therefore, adding absolute values,
|Wt −Wt+1| ≤
N∑
i=1
[∣∣∣tr(QiΓiQ˜†i )∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣tr(Q˜iΓiQ†i ))∣∣∣]+ ∣∣tr(Q′ΓQ′†)∣∣ (A.29)
To continue, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 25. For any m,n > 0 and matrices X ∈ Cm×n, Y ∈ Cn×n, Z ∈ Cn×m, we have | tr(XY Z)| ≤
‖X‖F‖Y ‖‖Z‖F . Here ‖ · ‖ and ‖ · ‖F denote the spectral norm and Frobenius norm, respectively.
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This lemma can be proved by using that | tr(XY Z)| ≤ ‖Y ‖‖XZ‖tr and ‖XZ‖tr ≤ ‖X‖F‖Z‖F , which
follows from [50, Exercise IV.2.12 and Corollary IV.2.6]. A more accessible proof is found online at [49].
Then by Lemma 25,
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣tr(QiΓiQ˜†i )∣∣∣ ≤
N∑
i=1
‖Γi‖‖Qi‖F‖Q˜i‖F (A.30)
Since
N∑
i=1
‖Qi‖2F =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈S
|ax|2 ‖Πi|ψxt 〉‖2
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2〈ψxt |
N∑
i=1
Πi|ψxt 〉
≤
∑
x∈S
|ax|2
= 1 (A.31)
and
N∑
i=1
‖Q˜i‖2F =
N∑
i=1
∑
x∈S
|ax|2 ‖Πi(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉‖2
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2〈ψxt |(I −Mx)
(
N∑
i=1
Πi
)
(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉
≤
∑
x∈S
|ax|2〈ψxt |(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt (A.32)
we have, by Cauchy-Schwarz,
N∑
i=1
‖Qi‖F ‖Q˜i‖F ≤
√∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt (A.33)
Therefore by A.30 and A.33,
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣tr(QiΓiQ˜†i )∣∣∣ ≤
√∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt max
i∈[N ]
‖Γi‖. (A.34)
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Similartly for tr(Q′ΓQ′†), we have
‖Q′‖2F =
∑
x∈S
|ax|2 ‖(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉‖2
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2〈ψxt |(I −Mx)|ψxt 〉
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt (A.35)
and using Lemma 25,
tr(Q′ΓQ′†) ≤ ‖Q′‖2F‖Γ‖ (A.36)
=
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt ‖Γ‖ (A.37)
Thus continuing from A.29, we have that
|Wt −Wt+1| ≤ 2
√∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt max
i∈[N ]
‖Γi‖+
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt ‖Γ‖ (A.38)
Finally, if we sum the above over t we obtain
|W0 −WT | ≤ 2 max
i∈[N ]
‖Γi‖
T−1∑
t=0
√∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt +
T−1∑
t=0
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt ‖Γ‖ (A.39)
The first term can be bounded using Cauchy-Schwarz:
T−1∑
t=0
√∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt ≤
√√√√T T−1∑
t=0
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt
≤
√
ǫT (A.40)
where we used
∑
t ǫ
x
t ≤ ǫ and
∑
x |ax|2 = 1. The second term can be summed easily:
T−1∑
t=0
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫxt ‖Γ‖ ≤
∑
x∈S
|ax|2ǫ‖Γ‖
= ǫ‖Γ‖. (A.41)
Therefore
|W0 −WT | ≤ 2
√
ǫT max
i∈[N ]
‖Γi‖+ ǫ‖Γ‖. (A.42)
Combined with our lower bound |W0 −WT | ≥ (1− 2
√
δ(1 − δ)− 2δ)‖Γ‖, this immediately gives
T ≥ (1− 2
√
δ(1− δ)− 2δ − ǫ)2
4ǫ
‖Γ‖2
maxi∈[N ] ‖Γi‖2 . (A.43)
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Recalling that [12]
Adv±(f) = max
Γ
‖Γ‖
maxi∈[N ] ‖Γi‖ , (A.44)
we obtain6
T ≥ (1− 2
√
δ(1 − δ)− 2δ − ǫ)2
4ǫ
Adv±(f)2. (A.45)
We now use the tight characterization of the quantum query complexity by the general weight adversary
bound:
Theorem 26 ([15, Theorem 1.1]). Let f : D → E, where D ⊆ {0, 1}N . Then Q0.01(f) = O(Adv±(f)).
Combined with our result above, we obtain
Bǫ,δ(f) = Ω
(
Q0.01(f)
2
ǫ
)
. (A.46)
B Proof of Theorem 8
We restate and prove Theorem 8:
Theorem 8. Let f : D → E, where D ⊆ {0, 1}N . Suppose there is a classical randomized query algorithm
A, that makes at most T queries, and evaluates f with bounded error. Let the query results of A on random
seed sA be xp1 , xp2 , · · · , xpT˜ (x) , T˜ (x) ≤ T , where x is the hidden query string.
Suppose there is another (not necessarily time-efficient) randomized algorithm G, with random seed sG ,
which takes as input xp1 , · · · , xpt−1 and sA, and outputs a guess for the next query result xpt of A. Assume
that G makes no more than an expected total of G mistakes (for all inputs x). In other words,
IEsA,sG


T˜ (x)∑
t=1
∣∣G(xp1 , · · · , xpt−1 , sA, sG)− xpt ∣∣

 ≤ G ∀x. (B.1)
Note that G is given the random seed sA of A, so it can predict the next query index of A.
Then Bǫ(f) = O(TG/ǫ), and thus (by Theorem 1) Q(f) = O(
√
TG).
Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we use the characterization of B by the modified bomb construction
given in section 5.1. This proof is substantially similar to that of theorem 3.
The following circuit finds xi with zero probability of explosion if xi = a, and with an O(1/L) probability
of explosion if xi 6= a (in both cases the value of xi found by the circuit is always correct):
6For boolean output (0 or 1) the 2δ term can be dropped, as we previously noted (Footnote 5).
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|0〉 R(θ)
M˜x
R(θ)
M˜x
X |xi〉
|i〉 . . . |i〉
|a〉 • |a〉
L times in total (B.2)
where θ = π/(2L) for some large number L to be picked later, and
R(θ) =

cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ

 (B.3)
The boxed part of the circuit is then simply [M˜x(R(θ)⊗I⊗I)]L, applied to the state |0, i, a〉. We can analyze
this circuit by breaking into cases:
• If xi = a, then M˜x|ψ〉|i, a〉 = |ψ〉|i, a〉 for any state |ψ〉 in the control register. Thus the M˜x’s act as
identities, and the circuit simply applies the rotation R(θ)L = R(π/2) to the control register, rotating
it from 0 to 1. We thus obtain the state |1, i, a〉; the final CNOT and X gates add a ⊕ 1 = xi ⊕ 1 to
the first register, giving |xi, i, a〉.
• If xi 6= a, then
M˜x|0, i, a〉 = |0, i, a〉, M˜x|1, i, a〉 = 0 (for xi 6= a) (B.4)
Therefore after each rotation R(θ), the projection M˜x projects the control qubit back to 0:
M˜x(R(θ) ⊗ I ⊗ I)|0, i, a〉 = M˜x(cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉)|i, a〉 = cos θ|0, i, a〉 (for xi 6= a) (B.5)
In this case the effect of M˜x(R(θ)⊗ I ⊗ I) is to shrink the amplitude by cos(θ); L applications results
in the state cosL(θ)|0, i, a〉. The final CNOT and X gates add a ⊕ 1 = xi to the first register, giving
|xi, i, a〉.
The probability of explosion is 0 if xi = a. If xi 6= a, the probability of explosion is
1− cos2L
( π
2L
)
≤ π
2
4L
. (B.6)
Pick
L =
⌈
π2G
4ǫ
⌉
. (B.7)
Then the probability of explosion is 0 if xi = a, and no more than ǫ/G if xi 6= a. If the bomb does not
explode, then the circuit always finds the correct value of xi.
We now construct the bomb query algorithm based on A and G. The bomb query algorithm follows A,
with each classical query replaced by the above construction. There are no more than TL ≈ π2TG/(4ǫ)
bomb queries. At each classical query, we pick the guess a to be the guess provided by G. The bomb only
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has a chance of exploding if the guess is incorrect; hence for all x, the total probability of explosion is no
more than
ǫ
G
IEsA,sG


T˜ (x)∑
t=1
∣∣G(xp1 , · · · , xpt−1 , sA, sG)− xpt ∣∣

 ≤ ǫ (B.8)
Thus replacing the classical queries of A with our construction gives a bomb query algorithm with probability
of explosion no more than ǫ; aside from the probability of explosion, this bomb algorithm makes no extra
error over the classical algorithm A. The number of queries this algorithm uses is
B˜ǫ,δ+ǫ(f) ≤
⌈
π2G
4ǫ
⌉
T, (B.9)
where δ is the error rate of the classical algorithm. Therefore by Lemma 5 and Lemma 2,
Bǫ(f) = O(Bǫ,δ+ǫ(f)) = O(B˜ǫ,δ+ǫ(f)) = O (TG/ǫ) (B.10)
C Proof of Theorem 10
We restate and prove Theorem 10:
Theorem 10 (Finding the first marked element in a list). Suppose there is an ordered list of N elements,
and each element is either marked or unmarked. Then there is a bounded-error quantum algorithm for finding
the first marked element in the list, or determines that no marked elements exist, such that:
• If the first marked element is the d-th element of the list, then the algorithm uses an expected O(√d)
time and queries.
• If there are no marked elements, then the algorithm uses O(√N) time and queries.
Proof. We give an algorithm that has the stated properties. We first recall a quantum algorithm for finding
the minimum in a list of items:
Theorem 27 ([39]). Given a function g on a domain of N elements, there is a quantum algorithm that
finds the minimum of g with expected O(
√
N) time and evaluations of g, making δ < 1/10 error.
We now give our algorithm for finding the first marked element in a list. For simplicity, assume that N
is a power of 2 (i.e. log2N is an integer).
Algorithm 28.
1. For ℓ = 20, 21, 22, · · · , 2log2 N = N :
• Find the first marked element within the first ℓ elements, or determine no marked element exists.
This can be done by defining
g(i) =
{
∞ if i is unmarked
i if i is marked,
(C.1)
and using Theorem 27 to find the minimum of g. This takes O(
√
ℓ) = O(
√
d) queries and makes
δ < 1/10 error for each ℓ. If a marked element i∗ is found, the algorithm outputs i∗ and stops.
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2. If no marked element was found in Step 1, the algorithm decides that no marked element exists.
We now claim that Algorithm 28 has the desired properties. Let us break into cases:
• If no marked items exist, then no marked item can possibly be found in Step 1, so the algorithm
correctly determines that no marked items exist in Step 2. The number of queries used is
log2 N∑
i=0
√
2i = O(
√
N) (C.2)
as desired.
• Suppose the first marked item is the d-th item in the list. Then in Step 1(a), if ℓ ≥ d, there is at least
a 1− δ probability that the algorithm will detect that a marked item exists in the first ℓ elements and
stop the loop. Letting α = ⌈log2 d⌉, the total expected number of queries is thus
α−1∑
i=0
√
2i +
log2 N∑
i=α
δi−α
√
2i +O(
√
d) ≤ 2
α/2 − 1√
2− 1 +
√
2α
1
1−√2δ +O(
√
d) (C.3)
= O(
√
2α) +O(
√
d) (C.4)
= O(
√
d). (C.5)
The probability of not finding the marked item at the first ℓ ≥ d is at most δ , and thus the total error
of the algorithm is bounded by δ.
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